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to establish any. fact material for the prosecution or to overcome any material fact sought to be proved by the defense, it is
admissible although it may connect the accused with an offense
not included in the charge.
[11] !d.-Evidence-Other Crimes.-Where the murder charged
was done with a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver, which
was never recovered, and there was evidence that at the time
of commission of a prior offense defendants had been in
the possession of three guns and that only two of these were
known not to have been Smith and Wesson .38 Specials, a
P38 automatic was admissible to corroborate testimony that
defendants acquired such weapon at a time when they already
had two guns, such evidence that defendants had a third gun
of unknown make being relevant to show that they had the
means to commit the crime.
[12] !d.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-InstructionsEvidence.-In a prosecution for murder, defendant could not
successfully complain that the court should have immediately
instructed the jury that a codefendant's references to his
participation in previous robberies could not be used against
him since the prosecution did not show that he had been
present when codefendant was interrogated, where throughout
the trial the eourt, when requested to do so, instructed clearly
that statements made by one defendant were not evidence
against another defendant who had not been present, and
repeated this warning in its general instructions at the close
of the trial, and where defendant did not request the court
to repeat its warning at this particular juncture.
[13] !d.-Appeal-Who May Urge Errors-Errors Affecting Codefendant.-Defendant may not complain that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to fail to produce witnesses that a
codefendant had in fact made the statements attributed to him
where the injury, if any, was to such codefendant whose
appeal is not before the appellate court.
[14] !d.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Preliminary Proof.
-The party relying on an expert analysis of demonstrative
evidence must show that it is in fact the evidence found at
the scene of the crime, and that between receipt and analysis
there has been no substitution or tampering.
[15] !d.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Preliminary Proof.
-The burden on the party offering demonstrative evidence is
to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all
the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty
with which the particular evidence could have been altered,
it i;;: reasonably certain that there was no alteration, and the
requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when some vital
link in the chain of possession is not accounted for.
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!d.-Evidence-Demonstrative Evidence-Preliminary Proof.
- \Vhen it is the barest speculation that there was
with demonstrative evidence, it is proper to admit the evidenc(;
and let what doubt remains go to its weight.
Id.- Evidence- Demonstrative Evidence- Fingerprints.--\Vhcre defendant did not point to any indication of adual
tampering with fingc;rprints on a bottle and
testii\ed to
as being his, did not show how they could have been
and did not establish that anyone who might have
interested in tampering knew that the bottle and
in a deputy sheriif's unlocked book case for a few
it
was not error to admit the bott.le and glass in evidnwe.
[18] Homicide- Instructions- Degree of Offense.- It was not
error to instruet the jury that, although there are two degrees
of murder, the evidenee is such that either or both defendant:-;
are innoeent of the eharge of murder or that one or both of
them are guilty of first degree murder, where the evidence
>vas overwhelming that the homicide was eommitted in the
perpetration of a robbery.
[19] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-Where the evidenee was such that defendant was guilty, if at all, of murder
in the perpetration of a robbery and the jury was instructed
that such offense was first degree murder, other instructions
on the code definition of murder, including provisions on premeditated murder and second degree murder, and the eode
definition of robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 189, 211), were unneeessary, but if any confusion was generated by such instructions
it eould only have benefited defendant by leading the jury
to think that the question of degree of murder was still open
to its determination.
[20] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-The jury may not weigh the
possibility of pardon or parole in determining the guilt of
accused in a murder case, but it may eonsider these consequences in exercising its discretion to choose between different
punishments.
[21] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.-It was not error for the
court in a murder case to give the jury information about
eligibility for parole before it had determined the question of
guilt or innocencP, where the court cautioned the jury against
allowing such information to influenee its determination of
guilt.
[22] Id.-Instructions-Punishment.--It was not error in n prosPcution for munle1· rommitted with n f\rpm·m to instnwt the
jury that defendant eould he paro!Pd in ~PY<'ll ,\'<'111'~ if sentem·ed
to Jifp imprisonment, sineP tlw proYision of Pen. Corle, ~ i10:2J,
subd. (b), fixing the minimum sPntPnePs fnr prrsons aru1Pd with
deadly weapons at 10 years, iil not concf•ru<>d with how mueh of
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'l'RAYNOR, J.-Richard G. Riser and his brother Roscoe
R Riser were charged by indictment with the murder of
Earl and Pauline Hastings. The jury returned verdicts of
guilty of murder in the first degree, without fixing the punishment at life imprisonment in the case of Richard G. Riser.
'l'he court denied his motion for a new trial and sentenced
him to death. His appeal to this court is automatic under
section 1239, subdivision (b) of the Penal Code.
Just before midnight on July 11, 1955, Earl and Pauline
Hastings, proprietors of the Hilltop Cafe near Oakdale in
Stanislaus County, were shot and killed during the course of a
robbery of their cafe. Mr. Basford, a customer, left the cafe
about 11 :30 p. m. On his way out he passed two men who
remarked that they were going in to have a beer. He was unable to identify either of the men, but thought that they
had driven up to the Hilltop in a two-tone Chrysler, Buick or
Pontiac.
·when these men entered the cafe, the only persons present
were two customers, Mrs. Burgess andlVIr. Pantel, both seated
at the bar, and the Hastings. 'l'he men sat on stools at the end
of the bar away from the other customers and ordered beers.
After they had ordered a second round of beers, the shorter
of the two rose from his stool, drew a gun, and announced,
"This is a stick-up." The other man, who was also armed,
silently took a position by the front door, while his companion
went behind the bar where the Hastings were. In an att(•mpt to prevent the robbery, Mr. Hastings seized a bottle and
attacked the gunman. In the ensuing struggle Hastings was
struck several times on the forehead and shot. The same
gunman then shot and killed Mrs. Hastings, apparently as she
was trying to reach a gun. Then he stepped over Mr.
Hastings' body, rifled the cash register, and departed with the
gunman at the door.
The police arrived shortly after midnight, removed the
bodies, and searched and photographed the premises. They
recovered several bullets fired by the gunman, and dusted
for fingerprints bottles and glasses found on the bar in front
of the stools used by the two men.

Dec. 1956]

PEOPIJE

v.

HISER

[47 C.2d 566; 305 P.2d 11

Mrs. Burgess identified Richard and Roscoe H.iser as the
two gunmen and testified that Hichard had done the shooting.
She admitted that she had been in the bar since 7 :30 p. m.
and had had five beers, that the bar was quite dark, and
that she could not see one of the men too well. Mr. Pantel
testified that he thought Richard was the man who did the
Rhooting, but was not positive; that he had not seen Roscoe
before the police lineup at Stockton, and that the man at the
door appeared to be of Filipino or Mexican extraction. Expert witnesses testified that fingerprints found on a bottle
and a glass removed from the bar were the fingerprints of
Richard Hiser, and that bullets found in a brief case in
Roscoe's Chrysler were similar in composition to bullets
found at the scene of the crime. The killing had been done
vvith a Smith and Wesson .38 Special revolver. This gun was
never recovered, but according to expert testimony a holster
found in Hoscoe 's car had once carried a Smith and \V esson
.38 Special revolvrr. The brothers' defense was an alibi:
that they had been in Stockton on the night of July 11th.
During the voir dire examination of jurors, Hardy M.
Dunavin stated that he did not believe in capital punishment,
that nothing would prevent his finding defendant guilty if
the evidence warranted it, but that in no event would he vote
for the dc>ath penalty. In response to the court's quc>stion
whether he entertained conscientious scruples that would prewnt his finding dc>fenclant guilty if the offense charged could
be punishable with death, he replied, "No." On the basis of
these answers, and over dc>fendant 's objection, the court
sustained a challenge by the prosecution under section 107 4,
subdivision 8, of the Pc>nal Code.
Section 1074, subdivision 8, provides that: "A challc>nge
for implied bias may be takE'n for all or any of the following
causes, and for no other . . . 8. If the offense charged be>
punishable with death, the entertaining of such conscientious
opinions as would predude his finding the defendant guilty;
in which case he mnst nrithc>r be permitted nor compelled
to serve as a juror." Defc>ndant contends that, although
this provision requires the exclusion of jurors whose determination of guilt would be affected by their views of eapital
punishment, neither its language nor its policy rc>quire the
exrlusion of those whose assessment of punishment alone wonld
be influenced, and that section 190 in proyiding that a person
found guilty of murder in the first degree "shall suffer death,
or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion
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diYision H. does not eompel the exelusion of jurors incapable
of exercising the di:-;eretion eontemplateu by section 190. *
It would be doing violenee to the purpose of these seetions of
the Penal Code, however, to construe section 1074, subdivision
8, to permit these jnrors to serve. It vvould in all probability
work a de faeto abolition of eapital punishment, a result
whieh, whether or not desirable of itself, it is hardly appropriate for this eourt to achieve by construction of an ambigucms statute.
Defendant contends that the admission in evidence of certain guns, holsters, belts, and shells was erroneous on the
ground that they were not relevant to any issue in the ease.
On the morning of July 23rd, almost two weeks after the
homicides, police found in Roscoe's Chrysler a brief ease containing three holsters, two leather belts, each with twelve
rounds of .38 special shells, a box of .22 shells, and fifty-nine
.38 special shells. 'l'wo more .38 shells were found in the seat
of the automobile. On the same day police arrested Richard
and seized a loaded Colt .38 revolver in his possession. Later,
following directions given them by Roscoe, they discovered
a P38 automatic with a clip of shells in a cesspool. '1'he court
overruled objections to testimony describing the finding of
tlwse objects and also admitted them into evidence.
[4] Some of the .38 special shells contain bullets that
were copper-coated factory loads, and others contained handcast lead bullets. There was expert testimony that the factory loads resembled in weight and shape a factory-load bullet
found at the scene of the crime, and although the expert could
not say that they came from the same box as that bullet, he did
maintain tbat they were of the same type and from the same
manufaeturer. Defendant brought out that this type of bullet
is in common use throughout the eountry; nevertheless, the
similarity testified to by the expert, together with the prosecution's showing that the .38 shells found in the brief case would
fit the type of revolver known to have been used in the killings, justified the trial court's admitting the factory loads.
[5] '1'he relevaney of the hand-east bullets was even clearer.
'l'lwre ~was expert testimony, based on spectroscopic analysis
*The awkwardness of testing the juror by use of the exact language
of section 1074, subdivision 8, was made abundantly clear in the present
rase. Time and again the court questioned the juror in the statutory
language, and time and again the juror replied that he did not entertain
sueh an opinion ''as would prevent him finding the defendant guilty.''
:F'inally, in order to make it ckar to the juror that he was being asked
if he opposed the death penalty, the court was compelled to abandon
the statutory language.
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the metal in the bullets, that those found in the brief case
were probably
from the same batch of lead as the
hand-cast bullets found at the scene of the crime. The expert
found ''a remarkable resemblance.''
[6] As to the holsters, experts testified that markings in
's Exhibit No. 26 indicated that it had once carried
Smith and \Y esson .38 Special revolver. Even if this is a
gun, we cannot say that possession of the holster was
not relevant to the issue of the lUsers' possession of the murder
weapon.
The prosecution's own witness established that the bullets
found at the scene of the crime had been fired from a Smith
~mel IN esson .38 Special revolver, not from either the Colt .38
or the P38 that the court admitted into evidence. [7] ·when
the specific type of weapon used to commit a homicide is not
known, it may be permissible to admit into evidence weapons
found in the defendant's possession some time after the crime
that could have been the weapons employed. There need be
no conclusive demonstration that the weapon in defendant's
possession was the murder weapon. (People v. Ferdinand,
194 Cal. 555, 563 [229 P. 341]; People v. Nakis, 184 Cal. 105,
113-114 [193 P. 92] .) [8] When the prosecution relies,
however, on a specific type of weapon, it is error to admit
evidence that other weapons were found in his possession, for
such evidence tends to show, not that he committed the crime,
but only that he is the sort of person who carries deadly
weapons. (People v. Riggins, 159 Cal. 113, 121 [112 P. 862] ;
People v. O'Brien, 130 CaL 1, 5 [62 P. 297]; People v. Yee
Fook Din, 106 Cal. 163, 165-167 [39 P. 530]; People v. Wong
Ah Leong, 99 Cal. 440 [34 P. 105] .) People v. Beltowski,
71 Cal.App.2d 18, 23 [162 P.2d 59], cited by the prosecution
as contrary to this proposition, is adequately distinguished in
People v. Richardson, 74 Cal.App.2d 528, 541-542 [169 P.2d
44], on the ground that no specific weapon was relied on in
the Beltowski case. It was error therefore to admit the Colt,
two of the holsters, the belts, and the box of .22 shells. The
P38 was admissible on other grounds that appear below.
[9] Defendant, however, was not prejudiced by these
errors. The shells and one holster were clearly admissible,
and from these the jury would have concluded that defendant
possessed firearms. The admission of the Colt, more holsters,
belts, and shells added little to the jury's knowledge gained
from evidence correctly admitted. The introduction of the
47 C.2d-19
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Colt may have actually hrnefited defendant, for it provided
an explanation for his pos~ession of: the .:i8 shells. An expert
testified that these shells would fit either a Colt or a Smith
and vVesson .38 Special, and without the Colt in evidence the
jury might more easily have concluded that the ammunition
was kept for a Smith and \Vesson.
Defendant next cites as prejudicial error the introduction
of evidence of other crimes. On the stand defendant maintained that the only pistols he had ever owned were the Colt,
the P38, and a toy cap pistol, and he denied having a Smith
and ·wesson .38 Special. He stated that he had obtained the
P38 from a sailor in the New Viking Bar, and denied having
told a police officer that he had taken it from Doc's Village,
a different bar. Officer Dutil then testified that defendant
had told him that he had taken the P38 from Doc's Village on
June 29, 1955. The prosecution followed this with testimony
by the bartender at Doc's Village that the two brothers had
robbed Doc's Village on ,Tune 29th, that each had been armed
with a blue steel gun, and that they had taken away with
them a P38 kept behind the bar. Finally, the owner of Doc's
Village identified the P38 found in the cesspool as the one
that had been kept behind the bar.
[10] Evidence of other crimes is not admissible when it
sole effect is to show a criminal disposition, but if it "tends
logically and by reasonable inference to establish any fact
material for the prosecution, or overcome any material fact
sought to be proved by the defense, [it] is admissible although it may connect the accused with an offense not included in the charge." (People v. Woods, 35 Cal.2d 504,
509 [218 P.2d 981] ; see People v. C·itrino, 46 Cal.2d 284, 288
[294 P.2d 32] .)
The cross-examination of defendant to discover whether
he had ever owned a Smith and vVesson .38 Special and when
he had acquired the P38, and the testimony of the witnesses
from Doc's Village, tended to establish that the Risers entered
Doc's Village on June 29th armed with two blue steel guns;
that they there acquired the P38; that therefore they had at
one time been in possession of three guns, and that only two
of these were known not to have been Smith and Wesson .38
Specials. [11] The P38 was admissible to corroborate the
bartender's testimony that the Risers acquired the P38 at
a time when they already had two guns. This evidence that
the Risers had a third gun of unknown make was relevant to
show that they had the means to commit the crime. (See
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People v. Simeone, 26 Cal.2d 795, 804-805 [161 P.2d 369] .)
The trial court closely limited the effect of the testimony on the Doc's Village incident to showing how the
Risers ·were armed and when they obtained the P38, and
specifically instructed the jury against drawing broad inferences of criminal tendencies. The court's further limitation of the testimony to purposes of impeachment was, if anything, unduly favorable to defendant.
Roscoe H.iser also took the stand. On direct examination
he stated that he had never b0en involved in a robbery; on
cross-examination the district attorney gave detailed descriptions of numerous robberies committed in San Francisco by
Roscoe and Richard, intermittently asking Roscoe if he had
not furnished these descriptions in admitting the robberies
to the police. Roscoe denied the prior inconsistent statements.
[12] Defendant complains that the court should have
immediately instructed the jury that these references to his
participation in robberies could in no way be used against
him, since the prosecution did not show that he had been
present when Roscoe was interrogated. Throughout the trial
the court, whenever requested to do so, instructed clearly
and at length that statements made by one defendant were
not evidence against another defendant who had not been
present, and it repeated this warning in its general instructions
at the close of the trial. There is no reason to suppose that
the jury, even though not reinstructed at this particular
juncture, did not understand and apply the general principle
the court had laid down. Furthermore, since defendant did
not request the court to repeat its warning at this time, he
cannot now complain.
[13] Defendant says that it was misconduct for the
prosecutor to fail to produce witnesses that Roscoe had in
fact made the statements attributed to him; that since the
prosecutor apparently had neither the intention nor the
means of establishing the truth of his allegations, he must
have made them solely to inflame the jury against the brothers.
( Cf. People v. Evans, 39 Cal.2d 242, 248-249 [246 P.2d 636].)
We must assume, however, that in view of the court's instructions the jury did not consider defendant's alleged participation in the robberies. The injury, if any, was to Roscoe,
and his appeal is not now before us.
As a further error, defendant eomplains of the admission
in evidence of a bottle and a glass bearing fingerprints testified to be the fingerprints of Richard Riser. Deputy Sheriff
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Lochry identified the bottle and glass as articles that he had
taken from the Hilltop Cafe. When he arrived at the Cafe,
early in the morning of July 12th, he found several bottles,
glasses, and salt cellars on the bar. He dusted them for
fingerprints, put them in a
and locked the box in the
sheriff's identification truck. About 4 or 5 a. m. he returned
to the sheriff's office and
the artieles in an open book
case in an office that he shared with another police officer.
This office >vas unlocked; it was flanked on one side by an
office shared by two or three persons, and on the other side
by a hall leading to a general office. According to Loehry,
the evidence remained in the book case approximately four
hours, until about 8 :30 a. m., when it was removed and thereafter kept under lock and key or in the eustody of specific
persons.
Defendant contends that in view of these facts the prosecution failed to establish continuous possession, which is a
necessary foundation for the admission of demonstrative evidence; that since someone eould have altered the prints or
imposed wholly new ones during the four hours the glass and
bottle were left unguarded iu the book case, the prosecution
has not sufficiently identified the prints as those that existed
when the articles were removed from the bar. Defendant
would require the prosecution to negative all possibility of
tampering.
[14] Undoubtedly the party relying on an expert analysis
of demonstrative evidence must show that it is in fact the
evidence found at the scene of the crime, and that between
receipt and analysis there has been no substitution or tampering (see People v. Coleman, 100 Cal.App.2d 797, 801 [224
P.2c1 837]; 21 A.L.R.2c1 1216, 1219, 1236-1237), but it has
never been suggested by the cases, what the praetiealities of
proof could not tolerate, that this burde11 is an absolute one
requiring the party to negative all possibility of tampering.
(See, e.g., People v. Brown. 92 Ca1.App.2d 360, 365 [206 P.2d
1095]; Commonwealth v. Mazarella, 279 Pa. 465, 472 [124 A.
163].)
[15] The burden on the party offering the evidence is
to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all
the eircumstances into account ineluding the ease or difficulty with which the particular eviclenee eonld have been
altered, it is reasonably certain that there >vas no alteration.
The requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when
some vital link in the chain of possession is not accounted
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that the evidence
received. Left to
the court must exclude the evidence. (Sec
Dobson v. Industrial Ace. Com., 114 Cal.App.2d 782, 785
P.2d
McGouxm v. Los Angeles, 100 Cal.App.2d
389-392
P.2d 862, 21 A.hR.2d 1206] ; People v.
324, 327-329 [203 P. 816]; Novak v. District of
160 F.2d 588 [82 App.D.C. 95] .) [16] Conversely, when it is the barest speculation that there was tamit is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt
remains go to its weight. (See People v. Tornasovich, 56 Cal.
520, 529 [206 P. 119] ; State v. Srnith (Mo.), 222 S.W.
455, 458-459.) [17] In the present case defendant did not
point to any indication of actual tampering, did not show how
fingerprints could have been forged, and did not establish
that anyone who might have been interested in tampering
with the prints knew that the bottles and glasses were in
Deputy Sheriff Lochry's book case. 'l'here was no error in
the court's ruling.
[18] In the course of instructing the jury the court stated
that ''Although there are two degrees of murder, the evidence
in this ease is such that either both of the defendants, or one
of them, is innocent of the charge of murder ... or one or both
of the defendants are guilty of murder in the first degree .
. . . For murder which is committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate . . . robbery . . . is murder of the
first degree; whether the killing was intentional, unintentional
or accidental." (See Pen. Code, § 189.)
Defendant contends that it was error for the court thus
to remove from the jury's consideration the degree of murder,
and whether in fact it had been in the course of a robbery
or attempted robbery. The evidence, however, was overwhelming that the homicides had been committed in the
perpetration of a robbery, and when there is no reasonable
doubt on this issue the court is justified in withdrawing it
from the jury. (People v. Sanford, 33 Cal.2d 590, 595 [203
P.2d 534] ; People v. Perkins, 8 Cal.2d 502, 516 [66 P.2d
631]; see People v. Rupp, 41 Cal.2d 371, 381-382 [260 P.2d 1] .)
Defendant offered no evidence indicating that a robbery had
not been committed, and in his own statement of facts to this
court he says that "the killing took place during the commission of a robbery.''
[19] In addition to this instruction on felony murder,
the court gave the jury the code definition of murder, in-

582

PEOPLE

i).

RISER

[47 C.2d

eluding the provisions on premeditated murder and second
degree murder, and the code definition of robbery. (Pen.
Code, §§ 189, 211.) These instructions were unnecessary
because they covered questions that had already been withdrawn from the jury by the first instruction. But if any
confusion was generated by these instructions, it could only
have benefited defendant by leading the jury to think that
the question of the degree of murder was still open to its
determination. {See People v. Peterson, 29 Cal.2d 69, 78-79
[173 P.2d 11], cert. denied, 331 U.S. 861 [67 S.Ct. 1751, 91
L.Ed. 1867].)
In the midst of its deliberations the jury returned to the
courtroom and the following discussion took place between
court and jury :
''THE FoREMAN : The question was, under those circumstances would either of the defendants be eligible for parole
if a recommendation was made for life imprisonment.
''THE CouRT : I see. Well, the answer of the Court is for
the purpose of determining the punishment and for that
purpose, only, it is the law that a person convicted of First
Degree Murder and sentenced to life imprisonment may be
eligible for parole. Does that answer your question?
''THE FoREMAN: Yes.
"THE CoURT: I might state that it further provides that
they may be eligible for parole but not before he has served
seven calendar years. Now, I just state that the law is worded
that way.''
The next day the jury informed the court that it had one
verdict complete as to one of the brothers. It then submitted
a written question to the court asking whether ''In the event
of what is a verdict of guilty on both counts one and two, is
there any recommendation the Jury can make that would preclude the possibility of parole during the lifetime of a person
convicted." The court answered, "No." Within an hour the
jury returned its verdicts of guilty, fixing the punishment at
life imprisonment for Roscoe, but with no specification of
punishment for Richard. Under the instructions that were
given the verdict as to Richard necessarily implied that the
jury fixed the punishment at death.
[20] It is now well established that although the jury
may not weigh the possibility of pardon or parole in determining the guilt of an accused, it may consider these consequences in exercising its discretion to choose between different
punishments. (People v. Reese, 47 Cal.2d 112, 116-117

Dec. 1956]

PEOPLE

v.

RISER

583

[47 C.2d 566; 305 P.2d 1]

[301 P.2d 582] ; People v. Byrd, 42 Cal.2d 200, 206-208 [266
P.2d 505], cert. denied, 348 U.S. 848 [75 S.Ct. 73, 99 L.Ed.
668] ; People v. Barclay, 40 Cal.2d 146, 158 [252 P.2d 321] ;
People v. Osborn, 37 Cal.2d 380, 384-385 [231 P.2d 850] .)
[21] Defendant contends, however, that it was error for the
court to give the jury information about eligibility for parole
before it had determined the question of guilt or innocence.
'l'his contention is without merit. In both People v. Reese,
supra, and People v. Byrd, supra, we upheld the trial court
when it had included in its original instructions to the jury
the information that one sentenced to life imprisonment could
be paroled. In those cases, as in the present one, the court
cautioned the jury against allowing this information to influence its determination of guilt. Prudence requires no more;
it does not require that the jury be kept in ignorance of the
consequences of different penalties until it has finally determined guilt. Moreover, it is by no means clear in the present
case that the jury, when it addressed its questions to the court,
had not already found defendant guilty.
[22] Defendant also claims that the court misinformed the
jury when it said that defendant could be paroled in seven
years if sentenced to life imprisonment; that because of sections 3024, subdivision (b), and 3048 of the Penal Code,
defendant could not be paroled in less than ten years.
Section 3024, subdivision (b), provides that the minimum
terms of sentence and imprisonment "for a person previously
convicted of a felony either in this State or elsewhere, and
armed with a deadly weapon ris) . . . 10 years . . . . " As
we pointed out in People v. Reese, 4 7 Cal.2d 112, 117-118
[301 P.2d 582], this provision is in an article of the code
concerned with the length of sentences and the fixing thereof,
and not with how much of a sentence must be served before
a prisoner is eligible for parole. That subject is covered in
a different article, embracing sections 3040 to 3065. Section
3049 provides that a person whose minimum term of imprisonment is more than one year may be paroled at any time after
the expiration of one-third of the minimum term. Section
3046 limits section 3049 by stating that no person imprisoned
under a life sentence may be paroled until he has served at
least seven calendar years. Authority to grant parole after
a certain portion of a minimum term has been served is not
destroyed by a provision sueh as seetion 3024 which sets the
minimum term itself.
Seetion 3048, also cited by defendant, limits eligibility for
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parole when a defendant has been adjudicated an habitual
criminal. Such an adjudication cannot be made unless the
prior convictions on which it is to be based have been charged
in the indictmrnt. (People v.
78 C:aLApp. 503.
506-507 [248 P. 946] .) No prior convictions were charged in
the indictment in the present ease, therefore section 3048 has
no application.
[23] Defendant's most serious objeetions go to the eyewitness testimony of Mrs. Burgess m1d. J\Ir. Pantel. One
eharge is that the prosecution improperly coached Mrs.
Burgess into identifying defendant as the man she had seen
at the Hilltop. lVIrs. Burgess identified defendant in a Stockton police lineup. She admitted that after this Lieutenant
Kilroy had been to her house on numerous occasions, shown
her pietures and taken her for rides, and that after her appearance before the grand jury the district attorney had discussed
her testimony with her on several occasions. 'l'here is no evidence, however, that she was prepared in any 'lvay before the
lineup, and she specifically denied having seen pictures of
defendant before that time. This evidence is insufficient
to justify a conclusion that lVIrs. Burgess' identification was
the result of an idea planted in her mind by the prosecution.
Before trial defendant moved for an order directing the
prosecution to furnish him with a copy of the fingerprint
taken from the bottle, and directing the sheriff's office of
Stanislaus County to allow him to inspect statements made
to police by lVIrs. Burgess and lVIr. Pantel immediately after
the homicides. The motion was denied.
After cross-examination of witnesses Burgess and Pantel,
defendant had issued a subpoena duces tecum addressed to
Captain Ross of the sheriff's office commanding him to produce the originals of the same statements sought by the
pretrial motion. The afiidavit in support of the subpoena
asserted that the statements were material and relevant to
issues in the case and contradictory to the witnesses' present
testimony. Defendant first learned of the statements from
local newspapers, which reported Captain Ross as saying that
the witnesses had described the man who did the shooting as
tall and slender, with a dark complexion and black hair, and
the other man as dark complexioned with black hair. Apparently the Riser brothers have blond hair anc11ight complexions,
and differ significantly in other characteristics from the newspaper descriptions. On cross-examination Mrs. Burgess admitted having made a statement to the police. She claimed,
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, that she described the man who did the shooting
, not as tall and slender, and although she admitted
the man by the door as dark complexioned, she
said that he had black hair.
v"'''-'u.c1vu moved for an order vacating the subpoena.
defendant's argument that he was entitled to the
Ktatements for purposes of impeachment, the motion was
on the ground that the subpoena sought to bring into
c:ourt evidence that could not be used for impeachment and
not otherwise admissible. Defendant contends that this
was erroneous.
at common law the accused in a criminal
action could not compel production of documents or other
eYidence in the possession of the prosecution. (See 6 \Vigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), 475-476; 8 id. at 219-220.)
Production was denied before trial on the ground that to
compel the prosecution to reveal its evidence beforehand would
enable the defendant to secure perjured testimony and fabricated evidence to meet the state's case. It was felt, furthermore, that to allow the defendant to compel production when
the prosecution could not in its turn compel production from
the defendant because of the privilege against self incrimination would unduly shift to the defendant's side a balance of
advantages already heavily weighted in his favor. (See generState v. 'T1tne, 13 N.J. 203 [98 A.2d 881] ; State ex rel.
Robertson v. Steel, 117 Minn. 384 [135 N.W. 1128, Ann.Cas.
1913D 343] ; 6 \Vigmore, Evidence, snpm, at 475-476.)
[24] \Yhatever the force of these arguments when directed
to pretrial discovery, they have little or no application when
production is sought by subpoena during trial of statements
referred to on cross-examination. The question then is not
whether the defendant will be allowed advance disclosure of
evidence upon which the prosecution plans to base its ease, but
whether he will be allowed any disclosure of evidence that the
prosecution does not intend to produce in court at all. (See
United States v. Kntlewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78 [156 A.L.R.
337].) Furthermore, the additional possibility that the defendant will obtain perjured testimony or fabricated evidence
as a result of disclosure at this point in the proceedings is too
slight to justify denying production. [25] The decisions of
this court have always impliedly recognized that on a proper
showing a defendant in a criminal case can compel production
when it becomes clear during the course of trial that the
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prosecution has in its possession relevant and material evidence. Production has been denied, not on the ground that
there was never any right to it, but because the requirements
justifying production had not been met in the particular case.
(People v. Gallardo, 41 Ca1.2d 57, 67 [257 P.2d 29] ; People
v. Bennijo, 2 Cal.2d 270, 276 [40 P.2d 823] ; People v. Glaze,
139 Cal. 154 [72 P. 965] .)
There is authority to the contrary (see, e.g., Little v. Unil'ed
St.ates, 93 F.2d 401, 407, cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644 [54 S.Ct.
643, 82 L.Ed. 1105] ; State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397 [91
N.E. 186] ), but we are convinced that the better reasoned decisions support the position implicit in our cases. (See Gordon
v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 [73 S.Ct. 369, 97 L.Ed. 447] ;
United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78-79 [156 A.L.R.
337]; Asgill v. United States, 60 F.2d 776, 778-779; People v.
Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 149-150 [186 N.E. 422]; People v.
Dellabonda, 265 Mich. 486, 496-507 [251 N.W. 594].) [26] Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept
confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement,
the state has no interest in denying the accused access. to all
evidence that can throw light on issues in the case, and in
particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony
of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined
and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits. To
deny flatly any right of production on the ground that an
imbalance would be created between the advantages of prosecution and defense would be to lose sight of the true purpose
of a criminal trial, the ascertainment of the facts. (See Gordon v. United States, supra, at 419; 8 Wigmore, Evidence,
supra, at 219-220; cf. People v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569 [18
N.W. 362].)
In People v. Glaze, supra, we refused to order production
of a statement that appeared to the court to be inadmissible
for any purpose, even for impeachment. The witness had
neither signed the statement nor adopted it in any way. The
lower courts have consistently enforced this requirement that
the evidence sought be admissible, without denying, however,
that production can be had when the evidence can be used to
impeach and is not confidential. (People v. Wilkins, 135 Cal.
App.2d 371, 377-378 [287 P.2d 555]; People v. Santora, 51
Cal.App.2d 707, 712 [125 P.2d 606] ; People v. Singh, 136
Cal.App. 233, 243 [28 P.2d 416] ; People v. Keyes, 103 Cal.
App. 624, 638-640 [284 P. 1096]; People v. Haughey, 79 Cal.
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App. 541, 543-544 [250 P. 406] ; People v. Nields, 70 Cal.App.
191 [232 P. 985] ; People v. Emmons, 7 Cal.App. 685, 690691 [95 P. 1032] .) [27] Nor do we think that the impeachment justifying production is necessarily restricted to impeachment by prior inconsistent statements to the exclusion, for
example, of impeachment for bias. (See Asgill v. United
States, supra, 60 F.2d at 779.)
[28a] In the present case the court denied production on
the ground that the statements could not be used to impeach
the witnesses. Vv e are at a loss to understand how the court
could have reached this conclusion without even seeing the
statements. Whether they were in writing or signed by the
witnesses the record does not show, and it is safe to say that
no one but the prosecution knew. Even if they were not signed,
defendant might have been able to show, by the testimony of
a stenographer or other witnesses or by the admissions of
Mrs. Burgess and Mr. Pantel themselves, that the statements
had been accurately transcribed and therefore could be used
for impeachment. (See People v. Bjornsen, 79 Cal.App.2d
519, 534-535 [180 P.2d 443]; People v. Orosco, 73 Cal.
App. 580, 593 [239 P. 82] .)
[29] Obviously a defendant cannot show conclusively that
a document is admissible without seeing it, and yet in order
to see it he is told that he must show that it is admissible.
The proper test for determining whether production must
be granted is not whether the evidence has been conclusively
proved admissible but whether, as stated in People v. Glaze,
supra, at 158, "there is good reason to believe that the document when produced would be admissible in evidence for some
purpose in the case . . . . '' There must be more than a mere
possibility that the statements when produced will contain
contradictory matter and be in such a form that they can be
used to impeach, but the chance that it may turn out eventually that they cannot be used for this purpose should not
block production at the threshold.
This precise problem, the relation between admissibility
and the right to production, was presented in Gordon v.
United States, supra, and the court there concluded that the
prosecution had not conceded enough in admitting that it
would be error to refuse to order production if it would be
error not to admit the evidence once produced. "[P]roduction may sometimes be required though inspection may show
that the document could properly be excluded." ( 344 U.S.
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at 418.) .As in the case before us, the court was faced with
a record that showed no reason
the statements once produced could not be used for impeachment.
[28b] That the statements of Mrs.
existed and were in the possession of the nY'nQc>r.nhr.n
police was never denied; that it was
inconsistent with the witnesses'
the
newspaper accounts. Defendant was unable to JWove conclusively that the statE>ments were in a form
use
for impeachment only because the
them in
its exclusive control. The prosecution did not elaim that the
necessities of law enforcement required that the statements
be kept confidential, and in view of the fact that the police
had released the substance of the statements to the press, there
could be no such claim. Defendant -vvas not
for
generally useful information, but demanded particular documents reasonably thought to be usable for the specific purpose of impeachment. Finally, defendant went as far as he
could without benefit of the statements, at least in the case
of Mrs. Burgess. Once the witness denied the prior inconsistencies, there was nothing further defendant could do to
press the impeachment. It does not appear that there were
any witnesses to the statements who could recall exactly what
had been said, and even if there were defendant was not compelled to rely on them if far more impressive documentary
proof was at hand. vVe conclude that defendant sustained
the burden imposed on him and that it was error to vacate
the subpoena.
[30a] In deeidinR whether this error was prejudicial we
must determine whether there was a reasonable probability
that the jury would haYe reached a different wrdict had defendant been allowed to obtain and introduce in evidence
prior inconsistent statements of the eyewitnessrs. (People
v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Even if we
assume that prior inconsistent statements would have impaired the value of the eyewitness testimony, there remained
against defendant the fingerprint evidence, the eYidence that
he possessed hand-cast bullets that probably had a common
origin with bullets found at the scene of the crime and a
holster that had once carried a Smith and \Vesson .38 Special,
and the evidence that he had had a gun in addition to those
he admitted owning.
Weighed against this evidence was the testimony of the
Risers that they had not been at the Hilltop on .July 11th.
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had been at the house of Della Fay
Roscoe's
friend, until 7 :30 or 8 o'clock in the
and then had gone on, Roscoe and Della to a movie
and Richard on a round of Stockton bars. Richard returned
home about midnight and did not see Roscoe until the next
Della
,Jones did not testify.
Hichard had earlier told police that it was probably on the
11th that he and Roscoe had gone to Riverbank to buy furreturning to Stockton by way of Oakdale where they
at a bar. At the trial he explained that he had
been confused about the dates as a result of almost continuous
by the police for three or four days. Roscoe
could not recall the Riverbank expedition at all.
\Vitness Basford testified that the two men he met coming
into the Hilltop Cafe had been in a Chrysler, Buick or
Pontiac. Both brothers testified that Roscoe's Chrysler had
a flat tire on the 11th, and Roscoe said that it had been left
in the backyard of their mother's house from the lOth until
the 13th, while they used an old Dodge converted into a
truck. 'l'heir mother stated that the Chrysler had been in
the yard from the lOth to the 13th, and that if it had been
removed it could only have been while she was asleep. A
witness for the prosecution testified that he had seen the
brothers getting into the Chrysler on the afternoon or evening
of the 11th, but on cross-examination his testimony proved
extremely weak.
[31] Fingerprint evidence is the strongest evidence of
identity, and is ordinarily sufficient alone to identify the defendant. (See People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 495 [165
P.2d 3], affd. 332 U.S. 46 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171
A.hR. 1223] .) [30b] Here there is in addition to the fingerprint evidence the evidence of a common origin for the handcast bullets, a "remarkable resemblance" which we have no
reason to believe could be the result of chance. The evidence
that the holster had once carried a Smith and Wesson .38
Special, and that defendant had possessed an unidentified
third gun, although not as strong as the fingerprint and bullet
evidence, contribute to an impressive total of proof identifying defendant. We are of the opinion, therefore, that it is not
reasonably probable that the jury, faced with this evidence,
would have chosen to believe instead the unsupported testimony of defendant that he had not been at the Hilltop Cafe
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on the night of July 11th; accordingly, there has been no miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 41f2.)
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by a majority
of this court that while it was error it was not prejudicial
error for the trial court to deny defendant the right to produce
documents containing statements by eyewitnesses allegedly
contrary to those made at the trial by such witnesses. In
my opinion nothing could be more prejudicial. It is impossible for an appellate court to say that the jury was not
impressed by testimony which absolutely identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime given by persons
present at the time the crime was committed.
In view of the holding in Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S.
414 [73 S.Ct. 369, 97 L.Ed. 447], it seems incredible that a
majority of this court could hold that this error was not
prejudicial. The same problem was there presented. The
court had this to say: ''By proper cross-examination, defense
counsel laid a foundation for his demand by showing that
the documents were in existence, were in possession of the
Government, were made by the Government's witness under
examination, were contradictory of his present testimony, and
that the contradiction was as to relevant, important and
material matters which directly bore on the main issue being
tried: the participation of the accused in the crime. The
demand was for production of these specific documents and
did not propose any broad or blind fishing expedition among
documents possessed by the Government on the chance that
something impeaching might turn up. Nor was this a demand for statements taken from persons or informants not
offered as witnesses. The Government did not assert any
privilege for the documents on grounds of national security,
confidential character, public interest, or otherwise. . . .
Indeed, we would find it hard to withstand the force of Judge
Cooley's observation in a similar situation that 'The State
has no interest in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure
of the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused
parties on the testimony of untrustworthy persons.' [People
v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569 (18 N.W. 362, 363) .] In the light
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of our reason and experience, the better rule is that upon
the foundation that was laid the court should have overruled
the objections which the Government advanced and ordered
production of the documents.
''The trial court, of course, had no occasion to rule as to
their admissibility, and we find it appropriate to consider that
question only because the Government argues that the trial
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, might have excluded
these prior contradictory statements and, since that would
not have amounted to reversible error, it was not such to
decline their production. We think this misconceives the issue.
It is unnecessary to decide whether it would have been reversible error for the trial judge to exclude these statements
once they had been produced and inspected. For production
purposes, it need only appear that the evidence is relevant,
competent, and outside of any exclusionary rule; for rarely
can the trial judge understandingly exercise his discretion
to exclude a document which he has not seen, and no appellate
court cmtld rationally say whether the exclttding of evidence
unknown to the record was error, or, if so, was harmless. The
question to be answered on an application for an order to
produce is one of admissibility under traditional canons of
evidence, and not whether exclusion might be overlooked as
harmless error.
"The Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that Marshall's admission, on cross-examination, of the implicit contradiction between the documents and his testimony removed the
need for resort to the statements and the admission was all
the accused were entitled to demand. We cannot agree. We
think that an admission that a contradiction is contained in
a writing should not bar admission of the document itself in
evidence, providing it meets all other requirements of admissibility and no valid claim of privilege is raised against
it. The elementary wisdom of the best evidence rule rests
on the fact that the document is a more reliable, complete
and accurate source of information as to its contents and
meaning than anyone's description and this is no less true
as to the extent and circumstances of a contradiction. We
hold that the accused is entitled to the application of that
rule, not merely because it will emphasize the contradiction
to the jury, but because it will best inform them as to the
document's impeaching weight and significance. Traditional
rules of admissibility prevent opening the door to documents
which merely differ on immaterial matters. The alleged
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contradictions to this witness' testimony relate not to collateral matters but to the very incrimination of
''
(Emphasis added; pp. 418-421.) It >vas concluded: '"l'he
Government, in its brief, argues strongly for the widest sort
of discretion in the trial judge in these matters and urges
that even if we finn error or irregularity we disregard it as
harmless and affirm the conviction. \Ve are well aware
the
necessity that appellate courts give the trial
wide latitude in control of cross-examination, especially in dealing with
collateral evidence as to character. Michelson v. United States,
335 U.S. 469 [69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168]. But this prineiple
cannot be expanded to justify a curtailment which keeps from
the jury relevant and important facts bearing on the trmstworthiness of crucial testimony. Reversals should not be
based on trivial, theoretical and harmless rulings. But we
eannot say that these errors were unlikely to h:we influenced
the jury's verdict. We believe they prejudiced substantial
rights and the judgment must be Reversed.'' (Pp. 422-423.)
The eyewitness testimony was by far the most important
evidence against this defendant. The murder weapon was
never found; the similarity in the hand-cast bullets was only
that they were ''probably of common origin''; and it was
thought that defendant's holster had once earried a gun of
a type of the murder weapon. It would appear to me that,
in Judge Cooley's language, the state should have no interest
in interposing any obstacle to the disclosure of facts; that all
material and relevant facts should be set forth for the determination of the jury and, if eertain state witnesses have been
aceused of making contradictory statements relating to a
material faet, those statements should also be before the jury
so that it could determine for itself the trustworthiness of such
witnesses. The Ameriean eoneept of due process most eertainly encompasses the right of an accused to he confronted
by trustworthy witnesses ana the right to show, if he can,
that witnesses against him may not be worthy of belief. Due
process most eertainly also encompasses the coneept that the
state will not seek to conceal material evidenee in the aeeused 's
favor. If due process of law does not cneom]1ass such concepts, then we have most assuredly departed a long way from
the very foundation upon whieh our system of jnstiee reststhe ideal that every man is presumed innoeent nntil proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In the wonls of l\Ir. Jnstiee
Holmes (Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 [48 S.Ct.
564, 72 L.Ed. 944, 66 A.L.R. 376]), it is better that one
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criminal escape than that the government play an ignoble part.
In Mesarosh v. United States (25 L.W. 4001, 4004, 4005)
the government moved to remand the case to the trial court
because of untruthful testimony given before other tribunals
by Mazzei, a government witness, although contending that
the testimony given in the instant case by Mazzei was ''entirely
truthful and credible." The government sought to have the
matter remanded to the District Court for a full consideration
of the credibility of the testimony of the witness Mazzei. The
counter-motion of petitioners asked for a new trial. In reversing the judgments below with directions to grant the petitioners a new trial, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for
the court, had this to say: "Mazzei, by his testimony, has
poisoned the water in this reservoir, and the reservoir cannot
be cleansed without first draining it of all impurity. This is
a federal criminal case, and this Court has supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings of the federal courts. If it has
any duty to perform in this regard, it is to see that the waters
of justice are not polluted. Pollution having taken place here,
the condition should be remedied at the earliest opportunity.
'The untainted administration of justice is certainly one of
the most cherished aspects of our institutions. Its observance
is one of our proudest boasts. This Court is charged with
supervisory functions in relation to proceedings in the federal
courts. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 [63 S.Ct.
608, 87 L.Ed. 819]. Therefore, fastidious regard for the
honor of the administration of justice requires the Court to
make certain that the doing of justice be made so manifest
that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be
assertrd.' Cmnnwm'st Party v. S11bversive Activities Control
Board, 351 U.S. 115, 124 [76 S.Ct. 663, 100 L.Ed. 1003].
"The government of a strong and free nation does not need
convictions based upon such testimony. It cannot afford to
abide with them. The interests of justice call for a reversal
of the judgments below with direction to grant the petitioners
a new trial.''
Surely the great State of California does not need convictions based upon the deprisation of an accused's constitutional
right to due process of law.
For the foregoing reasons I would revrrse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was deuiecl ,Jan nary
30, 1957. Carter, ,J., was of the opinion that ihc petition
should be granted.

